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//opt/cpanel/ea-openssl11/share/man/man3/RSA_check_key_ex.3
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Always turn off hyphenation; it makes .\" way too many mistakes in technical documents. .if n .ad l .nh .SH "NAME" RSA_check_key_ex, RSA_check_key \- validate private RSA keys .SH "SYNOPSIS" .IX Header "SYNOPSIS" .Vb 1 \& #include <openssl/rsa.h> \& \& int RSA_check_key_ex(RSA *rsa, BN_GENCB *cb); \& \& int RSA_check_key(RSA *rsa); .Ve .SH "DESCRIPTION" .IX Header "DESCRIPTION" \&\fIRSA_check_key_ex()\fR function validates \s-1RSA\s0 keys. It checks that \fBp\fR and \fBq\fR are in fact prime, and that \fBn = p*q\fR. .PP It does not work on \s-1RSA\s0 public keys that have only the modulus and public exponent elements populated. It also checks that \fBd*e = 1 mod (p\-1*q\-1)\fR, and that \fBdmp1\fR, \fBdmq1\fR and \fBiqmp\fR are set correctly or are \fB\s-1NULL\s0\fR. It performs integrity checks on all the \s-1RSA\s0 key material, so the \s-1RSA\s0 key structure must contain all the private key data too. Therefore, it cannot be used with any arbitrary \s-1RSA\s0 key object, even if it is otherwise fit for regular \s-1RSA\s0 operation. .PP The \fBcb\fR parameter is a callback that will be invoked in the same manner as \fIBN_is_prime_ex\fR\|(3). .PP \&\fIRSA_check_key()\fR is equivalent to \fIRSA_check_key_ex()\fR with a \s-1NULL \s0\fBcb\fR. .SH "RETURN VALUES" .IX Header "RETURN VALUES" \&\fIRSA_check_key_ex()\fR and \fIRSA_check_key()\fR return 1 if \fBrsa\fR is a valid \s-1RSA\s0 key, and 0 otherwise. They return \-1 if an error occurs while checking the key. .PP If the key is invalid or an error occurred, the reason code can be obtained using \fIERR_get_error\fR\|(3). .SH "NOTES" .IX Header "NOTES" Unlike most other \s-1RSA\s0 functions, this function does \fBnot\fR work transparently with any underlying \s-1ENGINE\s0 implementation because it uses the key data in the \s-1RSA\s0 structure directly. An \s-1ENGINE\s0 implementation can override the way key data is stored and handled, and can even provide support for \s-1HSM\s0 keys \- in which case the \s-1RSA\s0 structure may contain \fBno\fR key data at all! If the \s-1ENGINE\s0 in question is only being used for acceleration or analysis purposes, then in all likelihood the \s-1RSA\s0 key data is complete and untouched, but this can't be assumed in the general case. .SH "BUGS" .IX Header "BUGS" A method of verifying the \s-1RSA\s0 key using opaque \s-1RSA API\s0 functions might need to be considered. Right now \fIRSA_check_key()\fR simply uses the \s-1RSA\s0 structure elements directly, bypassing the \s-1RSA_METHOD\s0 table altogether (and completely violating encapsulation and object-orientation in the process). The best fix will probably be to introduce a \*(L"\fIcheck_key()\fR\*(R" handler to the \&\s-1RSA_METHOD\s0 function table so that alternative implementations can also provide their own verifiers. .SH "SEE ALSO" .IX Header "SEE ALSO" \&\fIBN_is_prime_ex\fR\|(3), \&\fIERR_get_error\fR\|(3) .SH "HISTORY" .IX Header "HISTORY" \&\fIRSA_check_key_ex()\fR appeared after OpenSSL 1.0.2. .SH "COPYRIGHT" .IX Header "COPYRIGHT" Copyright 2000\-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. .PP Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the \*(L"License\*(R"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file \s-1LICENSE\s0 in the source distribution or at <https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
